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WASHINGTON LAWYERS UNDER THE PURVIEW OF
ACT-THE
PROTECTION
CONSUMER
THE STATE
v.
"ENTREPRENEURIAL ASPECTS" SOLUTION-Short
Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 691 P.2d 163 (1984).
In Short v. Demopolis' the Washington Supreme Court held that certain
"entrepreneurial aspects" of the practice of law constitute "trade or commerce" for purposes of RCW 19.86, Washington's consumer protection
and antitrust law. 2 This holding brings members of the legal community
under antitrust and consumer protection scrutiny as embodied in the
Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The Demopolis decision, however, only
applies to the "entrepreneurial aspects" of the practice of law. Although
many courts and commentators have struggled with the question of whether
professionals should be given preferential treatment, 3 the Washington court
is the first to specifically exclude legal malpractice from consumer protection or antitrust legislation. 4 Under this rule, a lawyer who practices law
1. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 691 P.2d 163 (1984).
REV. CODE § 19.86 (1983) is commonly referred to as the Consumer Protection Act
2. WVASH.
(CPA).
3. See, e.g., Bauer,ProfessionalActivities and theAntitrustLaws, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 570, 602
(1975) (professional exemption from antitrust legislation may be justified due to the unique nature of the
legal profession, activities that appear violative of antitrust law ought to be analyzed under a rule of
reason analysis); Kauper, Antitrust and the Professions:An Overview, 52 ANTITusT L.L 163, 176
(1983) (it is possible that the Supreme Court will treat professionals differently as it has suggested in
dictum, but most certainly the Court will emphasize the role of competition); Sims, Maricopa: Are the
ProfessionsDifferent?, 52 ANTrrUST L.J. 177, 186 (1983) (at present there is no such thing as a learned
profession exemption and the Supreme Court has signaled its intent to take a hard-headed approach to
antitrust violations by the professions); Comment, Applicabilityof The TexasDeceptiveTradePractices
Act to Attorneys, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 65, 72 (1978) (the state deceptive practices act would change the
standard of care presently owed by attorneys) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices];Comment, The Washington Consumer Protection Act vs. the Learned Professional, 10
GoNz. L. REv. 435,437-38,454 (1975) ((1) attorneys are engaged in trade or commerce, (2) there are
no specific CPA exemptions for attorneys, and (3) certain conduct by attorneys may constitute unfair
and deceptive practices; conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the State Bar
Act would be both illegal and against public policy and therefore a per se violation of the CPA)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, The WashingtonConsumerProtectionAct]; Comment, Antitrust andthe
Professions: WhereDo We GoFrom Here?, 29 VILL. L. REv. 115 (1984) (survey of antitrust case history
noting that the trend is to bring professional activities under the scope of antitrust legislation);
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Antitrust and the Professions];Comment, The Applicability of the
Sherman Act to Legal Practiceand Other 'Non-Commercial' Activities, 82 YALEL.J. 313,325 (1972)
(the potential for economic evil rather than the type of activity is the determinative factor in finding
Sherman Act violations) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Applicability of the Sherman Act]; see
infra notes 25, 33, 40 for cases considering the learned professions exemption.
4. One other state court has determined that the CPA does not apply to the actual practice of law.
Frahm v. Urkovich, 113 Ill. App. 3d 580, 447 N.E.2d 1007 (1983). The Frahmcourt appears to have
excluded all consumer protection claims in the actual practice of law from the statute's scrutiny.
Demopolis may have only excluded malpractice. Other states that have considered the question have
held either that (1) the CPA applied to lawyers or (2) the particularpractice in question did not constitute
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negligently or otherwise commits malpractice 5 is not subject to liability
6
under the CPA if the malpractice involves the actual practice of law.
This Note analyzes the court's decision in light of prior state cases and
federal precedent and concludes that the court correctly applied the CPA to
lawyers' "entrepreneurial activities." However, to the extent it rules that
the performance of legal services is not trade or commerce, the holding is
too narrow. The court should have concluded that all aspects of the practice
of law are trade or commerce as defined by the CPA, but that certain acts,
such as professional negligence, may not be classified as "unfair or deceptive. " 7 The court could have both clarified a troublesome area of consumer
a forbidden element of the CPA. See Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190
Conn. 510, 461 A.2d 938, 943 (1983) (attorney deception in advertising and fee setting was within the
definition of trade or commerce as defined in the Connecticut Uniform Trade Practices Act, although
regulation of other aspects of law was a question left open); Ivey, Barnum & O'Mara v. Indian Harbor
Properties, 190 Conn. 528, 461 A.2d 1369, 1375 (1983) (lawyers not liable under the Connecticut
statute because the action lacked a nexus with the public interest); Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 So.
2d 1067, 1068 (La. App. 1979) (advertising was clearly trade or commerce subject to regulation by the
state bar and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law): Mathews v.
Berryman, 196 Mont. 49,637 P.2d 822, 824-25 (198 1)(Montana lawyer's actions held not to constitute
fraud, duress, or undue influence; thus the CPA did not apply); Barnard v. Mecom, 650 S.W.2d 123
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (liability under the Texas statute for a lawyer's failure to return money from a trust
fund held for the client): Lucas v. Nesbitt, 653 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (the Texas statute
applies to lawyers but there was no evidence to support the finding that the lawyer's acts were
unconscionable): DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631,632-33 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (lawyer's failure to
timely obtain name change for client's daughter held to fall with the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice
Act). aff'd per curiam, 612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1981).
5. Legal malpractice encompasses liability for negligence, breach of a fiduciary obligation or the
representation of adverse or conflicting interests. Common law fraud is not ordinarily included within
its definition. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 3-4 (2d ed. 1981).
6. Aspects of legal practice considered the actual practice of law that would be exempt from the act
were: (1) plaintiffs' neglect to properly gather essential facts and evaluate the partnership dissolution
such that the settlement was untimely, (2) plaintiffs' failure to pursue claims against Demopolis'
opponents causing him to lose valuable rights, (3) plaintiffs' failure to file a judgment in a timely
manner, and (4) plaintiffs' procurement of a defective judgment because it did not hold one of
Demopolis' opponents liable. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 61, 691 P.2d 163, 168 (1984).
Examples of entrepreneurial aspects that would fall under the CPA that were considered by the court
were how the price of legal services is determined, billed, and collected and the way a firm obtains.
retains, and dismisses clients. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d at 61, 691 P.2d at 168.
The "'practice of law" does not lend itself to a precise definition and it is only recently that the
Washington courts have attempted to define its parameters. A recent decision defined the practice of law
as including not only the performing of services in the courts of justice, but also the rendering of legal
advice, counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments. The selection and completion of preprinted
form legal documents has also been found to be the practice of law. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great
W. Union Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 91 Wn. 2d 48, 54-55, 586 P.2d 870, 875 (1978).
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility defines the practice of law as relating to the rendering
of services for others that calls for the professional judgment of a lawyer. "The essence of the
professional judgment of the lawyer is his educated ability to relate the general body and philosophy of
law to a specific legal problem of a client.
"MODEL CODE OF PROESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC
3-5 (1981).
7. The Washington CPA forbids "unfair or deceptive acts . . . in the conduct of any trade or
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protection law and avoided establishing a special exemption for the legal
profession by using this analysis.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Washington's Antitrust and ConsumerProtection Statute

Washington's CPA is an antitrust and consumer protection statute that
implements the Washington Constitution's article XII, section 22 prohibition of monopolies and trusts. 8 The CPA is modeled after the federal
antitrust laws and incorporates many of their provisions. 9 The legislatively
declared purpose of the CPA is to complement federal antitrust law "in
order to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition.' 10
Accordingly, the legislature instructed the Washington courts to be guided
by decisions of the federal courts and the FTC which construe the various
federal antitrust statutes. ll
Short v. Demopolis involved an alleged violation of the CPA, section
19.86.020 of the Washington Code, which forbids "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." 12 This section
differs from traditional antitrust legislation because it is essentially directed
to consumer protection, rather than the prevention of monopolies.13 To
commerce." WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.020 (1983).
8. O'Connell, Washington Consumer ProtectionAct-Enforcement Provisionsand Policies, 36
WASH. L. REv. 279 (1961).
9. Dewell & Gittinger, The Washington Antitrust Laws, 36 WASH. L. REv. 239, 242 (1961).
The three federal acts are the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTCA). Section .020 of the CPA is based upon § 5(a)(l) of the FTCA, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (a)(l); § .030oftheCPAisbasedupon § 1oftheShermanAct, 15 U.S.C. § 1; § .040oftheCPA
is based upon § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; § .050 of the CPA is based upon § 3 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14; § .060 of the CPA is based upon § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18;
§ .070 of the CPA is based upon § 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17.
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1983).
11. Id. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.920 doesnot require courts to follow federal precedent, but to be
guided by such precedent. Ultimately the interpretation given to the CPA is left to the state court. State
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wn. 2d 259, 275, 501 P.2d 290, 301 (1972).
A number of state consumer protection statutes contain similar provisions. For a study comparing
state consumer protection statutes, see Lovett, State Deceptive TradePracticeLegislation, 46 TUL. L.
REv. 724 (1971).
12. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.020 (1983). This language is essentially identical to that used in the
FTCA. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1). Unlike the FrCA, however, the CPA allows for lawsuits by private
individuals. In addition, under both the FTCA and the Sherman Antitrust Act, the act or practice need
not be in the conduct of trade or commerce. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45 (a)(1). The CPA requires that the act be
"in" trade or commerce. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.020 (1983). Therefore, the determination of what
constitutes trade or commerce is crucial to a CPA action.
13. The FICA, although not statutorily classified as an antitrust statute, is generally considered as
such. 16J J. VON KALINOWSKI, BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS, ANTrTRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION

119-9 (1985). The FTC is divided into various bureaus charged with different duties. The Bureau of
Consumer Protection is primarily responsible for investigating unfair and deceptive acts. Id. at 124-11.
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prove an unfair or deceptive trade practice under the CPA, the injured party
must show that (1) the act or practice occurred in the conduct of trade or
commerce, 14 (2) the conduct was not exempt from the CPA, 15 (3) the
conduct was unfair or deceptive, 16 and (4) the conduct affected the public
interest. 17
B.

Washington Case Law

Washington cases prior to Demopolis had not explicitly decided
whether lawyers or other professionals are subject to the CPA. In a case
predating the CPA's enactment, however, the Washington Supreme Court
concluded that a medical society was liable for "restraint of trade" against
a contract medical association. 18 That case at least implicitly decided that
14.
BOOK].

III WASHINGTON COMMERCIAL LAW DESKBOOK 27-6 [hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON DESK-

Significantly, the Washington CPA contains its own definition of trade or commerce. See infra notes
95-96 and accompanying text.
15. WASHINGTON DESKBOOK, supra note 14, at 27-6. See generally Comment, The Scope of the
RegulatedIndustriesExemption Under the Washington ConsumerProtectionAct, 10 GONZ. L. REv. 415
(1975). WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.170 (1983) provides that actions or transactions specifically
permitted by regulatory boards established under title 18 of the Washington Code shall not be construed
to violate WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86. Because title 18 provides for the establishment of the state bar,
activities specifically mandated by the supreme court that concern legal regulation would be exempt
from the CPA.
16. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 53, 70, 691 P.2d 163, 172 (1984) (Pearson, J., concurring).
The CPA does not define the terms unfair and deceptive. The Washington Supreme Court has held that
the meaning of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" is to be arrived at by a "gradual process ofjudicial
inclusion and exclusion." State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wn. 2d 259, 274,501 P.2d 290,301 (1972)
(quoting from Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931)).
17.

WASHINGTON DESKBOOK, supranote 14, at 27-6. The public interest requirement is determined

by reference to the so-called Anhold test. See Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn. 2d 40, 46, 614 P.2d 184, 188
(1980). The elements of the Anhold test are: (1) whether the defendant by unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of trade or commerce has induced the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting, (2)
whether the plaintiff suffered damage brought about by such action or failure to act, and (3) whether the
defendant's deceptive acts or practices have the potential for repetition. Id.
The public interest test may also be satisfied by a legislative or judicial declaration that the activity is
within the public interest. This method, known as a perse violation, was judicially developed in State v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wn. 2d 259, 276, 501 P.2d 240, 301-02 (1972).
18. Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wn. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951). The
case involved the efforts of the King County Medical Society to undermine the reputation and increase
the expenses of Group Health. The court held that there was a combination, the purpose of which was to
limit production and fix prices so as to restrain competition and create a monopoly. Id. at 645, 237 P.2d
at 769.
The court also determined that at common law, the term "restraint of trade" was deemed to cover the
practice of medicine. Id. at 638, 237 P.2d at 765.
The Washington constitutional provision was adopted prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act, but
both arise from the same common law principle discouraging monopolies and restraints of trade. Id. at
635, 237 P.2d at 763.

928
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physicians could be held accountable for Sherman Antitrust Act-type
violations. 19
Since the statute's enactment in 1961, the only case attempting to
specifically apply the CPA to lawyers was LighOfoot v. MacDonald.20 In
Lightfoot, the Washington Supreme Court rejected a CPA cause of action
for alleged lawyer malpractice on the grounds that the plaintiff was unable
to show damage sufficiently impacting the public. 21 The court did not
expressly reach the question of whether the lawyer was engaged in trade or
commerce within the meaning of the Act. 22 Subsequent case law also failed
23
to answer the question.
C. The ProfessionalExemption
The foundation for the argument that lawyers' services do not constitute
trade or commerce is the "learned professions"' exemption from antitrust
law.24 Dictum alluding to such an exemption first surfaced in The Schooner
Nymph Case,25 decided in 1834. In that case Justice Story wrote: "Wherever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose
of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned
professions, it is constantly called a trade. ' ' 26 The classic rationale for
19. See Bauer, supra note 3, at 583-84.
20. 86 Wn. 2d 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976). One other Washington court has considered the Act's
application to attorneys and held that attorneys acting as de facto corporate officers may be subject to
liability under the CPA. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins., 37 Wn.App. 756, 683 P.2d 207 (1984). In
addition, the Washington Supreme Court has held that the unauthorized practice of law may lead to a
CPA violation. See infra note 23.
21. Lightfoot, 86 Wn. 2d at 338-39, 544 P.2d at 92-93.
22. "Whether the lawyer who was sued in that action [Lighfooot] was engaged in 'trade or
commerce' was a question which we left unanswered." Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn. 2d 40, 47-48, 614
P.2d 184, 189 (1980) (Rosellini, J., concurring).
23. Although other cases have not addressed the question of the CPA's relationship to a lawyer's
practice, one case did apply the statute to an escrow agent involved in the unauthorized practice of law.
See Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins., 100 Wn. 2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983). In Bowers, the court held
that the unauthorized practice of law was unfair and deceptive and was within the ambit of trade or
commerce. Id. at 591, 675 P.2d at 200-01. In Petitioner's Reply Brief to the supreme court, Demopolis
urged that if the rendition of legal services by nonlawyers was trade or commerce, then the same rule
should also apply to lawyers. The supreme court did not address that argument in its opinion. Reply
Brief for Petitioner at 15, Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 691 P.2d 163 (1984).
24. Among the occupations that have been considered "professional" are medicine, law, accounting, veterinary medicine, dentistry, real estate, the priesthood and engineering. Bauer, supra note 3, at
570 n.6. Although this Note only considers the exemption as applied to lawyers, it will refer to cases
dealing with other professions.
25. 18 F. Cas. 506 (C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388).
26. Id. at 507. Dicta concerning a learned professions exemption has surfaced in numerous federal
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952) (ethical
considerations between patient and physician are quite different than the usual considerations prevail-
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distinguishing the professions from business was that business persons are
motivated by profits while professionals strive to provide services to the
community. 27 The objective of the professional was thought to be inconsis28
tent with the requirement of competition found in antitrust law.
The federal courts have encountered three different factual settings in
which the issue of the professional exemption arises: (1) when acts of
professionals directly interfere with the commercial activities of nonprofessionals, (2) when acts of professionals directly interfere with the
activities of other members of the profession, and (3) a combination of
both. 29 It is well established that there is no professional exemption in the
first situation. The courts have held that the antitrust laws strike broadly
enough to reach "every person" engaged in restraints of trade, regardless of
occupation. 30 For example, in American Medical Ass'n v. United States,
the Supreme Court found that it did not need to reach the question whether
physicians were involved in trade or commerce when the purpose and effect
31
of their conspiracy were to restrain the business of providing health care.
The mere fact that the professionals were interfering with an ongoing
32
business brought the activity within the Sherman Act.
ing in ordinary commercial matters, and forms of competition usual in the business world may be
demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286
U.S. 427, 436 (1932) (quoting Schooner Nymph for the proposition that the term "trade" does not
encompass the learned professions and liberal arts); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S.
643, 653 (1931) (medical practitioners follow a profession and not a trade, and are not engaged in the
business of making or vending remedies but in prescribing them); Federal Baseball Club v. National
League, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (personal effort not related to production is not a subject of
commerce, and lawyers traveling to other states do not engage in commerce as a result of their travel);
Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266,269 (8th Cir. 1957) cert. denied, 355 U.S.
954 (1958) (quoting United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 95 F. Supp. 103, 118 (D.C. Or. 1950)),
aff'd, 343 U.S. 326 (1952) (the practice of medicine as conducted in Oregon is not trade or commerce
within the meaning of § 1of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
In other cases, liability has been found on antitrust grounds, but the Court has refused to rule on the
status of the professional exemption. E.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339
U.S. 485, 491-92 (1950) (Court did not rule on the application of the term "trade" to the professions,
but concluded that it would contract the scope of the concept of "trade" to exempt real estate brokers
from the Act); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943) (Court acknowledged that there had been much discussion about whether a physician's practice constituted trade under
§ 3 of the Sherman Act, b.t the question was moot since the effect of the physicians acts was to restrain
the business of the plaintiff).
27. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1975).
28. Id.
29. Annot. 39 A.L.R. FED. 774, 779 (1978).
30. Id. at 780.
31. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943); See Annot. 39 A.L.R.
FED. at 780 (1978).
32. American Medical Ass'n, 317 U.S. at 518. See supra note 12 for an explanation of the
differences between the CPA and the Sherman Act.
The Washington equivalent to the Sherman Act is WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.030 (1983): "Every
contract, combination, in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
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The second and third types of cases have proved more difficult, and it is
here that the courts have struggled with the classification of professional
activity as trade or commerce. The particular difficulty has been the courts'
recognition that while some aspects of a professional's activities are properly classified as business, others cannot be considered as such. 33 Some
courts dealt with the problem by designating certain aspects of a practice or
the motive of a professional as commercial and therefore subject to antitrust

legislation. 34 Under this line of authority, action resulting from noncommercial motives generally was not considered to be within the scope of
35

antitrust law.

The problem of classifying professional activities was seemingly laid to
rest in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1975.36 Goldfarb involved the publication of minimum
fee schedules by a county bar association. 37 The Court reasoned that in
enacting the antitrust legislation, Congress drafted broadly and did not
intend to exclude professionals. 38 Furthermore, the Court noted that the
is hereby declared unlawful." Thus, even if the practice of law were not considered trade or commerce,
an attorney's conspiracy to restrain trade would violate § 19.86.030.
33. Annot. 39 A.L.R. FED. at 780 (1978).
34. Cases that have developed the commercial/noncommercial theme are: Marjorie Webster Jr.
College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (in applying the Sherman Act to an educational accrediting
association, the court stated that the proscriptions of the Sherman Act are "tailored for the business
world, not for the noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions"); Northern
Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 385 (9th Cir. 1962) (Sherman Act violations
by druggists involved an entrepreneurial rather than a professional activity), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862
(1962); Selman v. Harvard Medical School, 494 F. Supp. 603, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (the court did not
apply the Sherman Act to a student who had been repeatedly denied access to medical school, arguing
that academic admissions criteria may have an incidental effect on the commercial aspects of the
medical profession, but were nevertheless noncommercial in nature), aff'd mem., 636 F.2d 1204 (2d
Cir. 1980); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (the
court did not apply the Sherman Act to a student hockey player who was denied access to the school
team due to previous participation for money; the court stated that the act was "tailored for the business
world," and not as a mechanism for the resolution of controversies in the liberal arts or learned
professions); United States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F Supp. 507,517 (D. Or. 1974)(citing Northern
Cal. Pharmaceutical,and Marjorie Webster Jr. College, the court suggested that the adoption of a
commercial/noncommercial dividing line was perhaps just an application of the "rule of reason").
35. But cf.Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 655 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970), where the court
applied the commercial/noncommercial test but admitted that there may be situations where a traditionally noncommercial activity would be conducted with a commercial motive, thus rendering it
commercial. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
36. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
37. The fee schedule was published by the Fairfax County Bar Association, but enforced by the
Virginia State Bar Association. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 776.
38. Id. at 787. "The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the
Sherman Act. . .nor is the public-service aspect of professional practice controlling in determining
whether § I [Sherman Act] includes professions."
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sale of a lawyer's services was commerce and thus within the scope of
39
antitrust legislation.
The Goldfarb decision seemed to destroy the rationale for the professional exemption and to bring legal services squarely within the trade or
commerce designation. In a footnote, however, the Court cautioned against
a blanket application of antitrust law to professionals. 40 Thus, while the
Court rejected the professional exemption in Goldfarb, it left open the
possibility that in some future situation special consideration might be
granted to the professional.
Since Goldfarb, however, the federal courts have failed to countenance
any blanket exemption for the "learned professions."41 The Supreme Court
has consistently applied the same standards of antitrust law to professionals
that it applies to those engaged in traditional commerce. 42 Moreover, the
cautionary footnote in Goldfarb has been so restricted by subsequent cases
Id. at 787-88.
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is. of
course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business
activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other situation than the one
with which we are confronted today.
Id. at 788-89 n.17.
41. See Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 58-59, 691 P.2d 163, 166-67 (1984); see also 16E J.
VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 13, at 49-20. A case considering a professional association's antitrust
liability after Goldfarb is Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,371-72 (1977) ("[T]he belief that lawyers
are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism..."). In Bates the Supreme Court ruled that
the state of Arizona could regulate attorney advertising, exempting it from antitrust law under the "state
action" doctrine, but also ruled that the first amendment requires that attorneys be given the opportunity
to advertise. Id. at 379-82; see also Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075, 1079 (4th Cir. 1976) (the
Sherman Act contains neither an express nor an implied exclusion of professional commercial activity,
nor does the Act exempt professionals), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977). See also Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (physicians who were parties to price fixing
agreement were not exempted from the Sherman Act); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (engineer's ethical canon against competitive bidding was contrary to the
Sherman Act); American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 1980)
(the business aspects of medical practice fall within the scope of the FTCA even if they are secondary to
the charitable and social aspects of the physicians' work), aff'd per curiam, 455 U.S. 676 (1982):
Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1149 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(NCAA subject to the Sherman Act); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628
(D.D.C. 1979) (architects subject to antitrust laws).
42. Bierig, Whatever Happened to ProfessionalSelf-Regulation?, 69 A.B.A. J. 616. 618 (1983)
(despite dicta to the contrary, the Supreme Court has applied the same standard to professional selfregulation as it has applied in other contexts); Kauper, supra note 3, at 168 (the Supreme Court has been
unrelenting in the professional cases that have come before it since Goldfarb;substantively, the Court
has ruled consistently against the professions involved). For an analysis suggesting that professionals
will no longer be accorded any preferential treatment under the antitrust laws, see Comment. Antitrust
and the Professions. supra note 3.
39.
40.
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that there appears to be little support left for special treatment of the

professions. 43
H.

THE SHORT v. DEMOPOLIS DECISION

A.

Facts of the Case

In March of 1980, defendant Demopolis hired the law firm of Short and
Cressman to represent him in two pending lawsuits.44Both suits were
settled in Demopolis' favor, but disputes arose concerning the rendering of
legal services and the payment of attorney fees. Eventually, plaintiff Short
and Cressman sued Demopolis for breach of an express contract to pay for
legal services. Demopolis counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, unfair and
deceptive practice in violation of the Washington CPA. 45
The trial judge dismissed Demopolis' CPA counterclaim for failure to
state a cause of action. On appeal, the supreme court considered two major
issues: (1)whether the practice of law constituted trade or commerce within
the meaning of the CPA or Washington case law, and (2) whether applying
the CPA to the legal profession would unconstitutionally infringe upon the
46
judiciary's exclusive power to regulate the practice of law.
B.

The Holding of the Court

The court held that lawyers may be subject to liability under the CPA as
to the "entrepreneurial aspects" of the practice of law, but that the CPA
does not apply to those claims that allege pure negligence or legal malpractice. 47 In reaching this decision, the opinion of the court differed from a
43. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) ("The
cautionary footnote in Goldfarb. . .cannot be read as fashioning a broad exemption under the Rule of
Reason for learned professions. "). See 16EJ. VON KALwNOWSKI, supranote 13, at 49-23 through 49-24.
44. The first suit involved a dissolution of a real estate partnership. Although the complaint alleged
damages in excess of $200,000, the case was settled for $7500. Attorney fees totalled $19,958.53. The
second suit involved a real estate forfeiture. Demopolis prevailed, receiving possession ofthe premises,
rental delinquencies, and damages. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d at 53, 691 P.2d at 164.
45. Demopolis alleged ten causes of action: (1) unfair and deceptive practices in violation of the
CPA, (2) breach of contract, (3) violation of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) DR
2-106 (excessive fees), (4) violation of CPR DR 6-101 (incompetence), (5) negligence and malpractice,
(6) fiduciary duty violations, (7) misrepresentation, (8) violation of CPR DR 2-110 (threat to withdraw)
causing mental distress, (9) reformation of contract, and (10) attorney fees assessment. Demopolis, 103
Wn. 2d at 54, 691 P.2d at 165.
46. Id. at 55, 691 P.2d at 165. A third issue considered by the court was whether the availability of
other remedies to Demopolis should invalidate a CPA claim. The court held that the CPA was designed
to give an additional remedy to those already available. Id. at 65, 691 P.2d at 170. The issue is not
discussed in this Note.
47. Id. at 65-66, 691 P.2d at 170. See supranote 6 for the court's examples of entrepreneurial and
noncommercial behavior.

933

Washington Law Review

Vol. 60:925, 1985

concurring opinion joined by four justices as to the definition of the scope
of CPA liability. 4 8 The four concurring justices developed a strict analysis
and argued that all noncommercial aspects of law are exempt from the
CPA's application. 49 The court, on the other hand, held that questions of
malpractice are exempt from the CPA, but suggested that other acts in the
practice of law may lead to CPA liability. 50 This distinction implies that the
CPA could be applied to other unfair or deceptive acts in the practice of law
that do not constitute pure malpractice. Justice Dore, for example, wrote a
separate concurring opinion to emphasize that coverage of the CPA should
not be limited to commercial aspects of law in cases where deceptive
51
advertising leads to a negligence claim.
The supreme court also addressed the issue of whether the application of
the CPA to lawyers would violate the separation of powers doctrine. 52 The
majority concluded that as applied to the entrepreneurial aspects of the
practice of law, the CPA did not impinge upon the court's constitutional
power. 53 A vigorous dissent, however, argued that the CPA would violate
54
the separation of powers doctrine.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS
Separation of Powers

The majority held that the CPA's application to the legal profession
would not unconstitutionally infringe upon the judiciary's exclusive
power to regulate the practice of law. 55 The dissent argued that applying
the CPA to the practice of law would permit a "vague dual existence" of
regulation by the legislature and the court, thus infringing upon the
56
court's power.
48. Justices Dimmick and Cunningham (pro tern) joined Justice Dolliver in writing the opinion of
the court. Justices Williams, Brachtenback, and Hamilton (pro tem) joined Justice Pearson in a
concurring opinion. Justice Dore separately concurred and Justice Rosellini dissented.
49. In reference to the majority's inconclusive statements. Justice Pearson wrote: "[Ilt leaves one
with the impression that the CPA should be applied to all aspects of legal practice, rather than just to the
business aspect." Id. at 70, 691 P.2d at 172 (Pearson, J., concurring).
50. The opinion of the court stated that the Demopolis ruling did not determine whether the CPA
applies to every aspect of the practice of law. Id. at 66, 691 P.2d at 170-71.
51. Id. at 67-68, 691 P.2d at 173 (Dore, J., concurring).
52. For a historical discussion of the separation of powers doctrine in Washington, see In re Salary
of Juvenile Director, 87 Wn. 2d 232, 238-49, 552 P.2d 163, 167-72 (1976).
53. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 65, 691 P.2d 163, 171 (1984).
54. Id. at 72, 691 P.2d at 174 (Rosellini, J.. dissenting).
55. Id. at 62, 691 P.2d at 170.
56. Id. at 72, 691 P.2d at 174 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). The "vague dual existence" language
comes from State ex rel. Schwab v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 80 Wn. 2d 266, 269, 493 P.2d 1237.
1238-39 (1972) (the state bar act is merely advisory and does not impinge upon the court's exclusive
authority to suspend a person from practice or take disciplinary action against a lawyer).
The dissent also argued that Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510,
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The court's jurisdiction over the legal profession is derived from the
Washington State Constitution article IV, section 1.57 Early cases defined
the court's inherent powers as the authority to admit, discipline, and disbar
attorneys. 58 The court, however, did not claim exclusive authority and
conceded that the legislature could regulate and restrict the court's power. 59
More recently the court has redefined its power over admission and disbarment as exclusive and incapable of infringement by the legislature or
60
executive.
461 A.2d 938 (1983), a decision relied upon by the majority, was logically insupportable. Demopolis,
103 Wn. 2d at 77-78, 691 P.2d at 176-77. The Heslin court concluded that the Code of Professional
Responsibility emphasizes ethical and regulatory functions, while the CPA addresses the pragmatic
concerns of the public. Since the Acts have different functions, they are able to exist side by side without
violating the separation of powers doctrine.
As the dissent noted, the Code of Professional Responsibility is also pragmatic in its approach and the
Heslin distinction is therefore inaccurate. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d at 78,691 P.2d at 177 (Rosellini, J.,
dissenting). This Note takes the position, however, that since the Code attempts to regulate attorneys
within the profession and the CPA seeks to protect the public, the two codes may coexist despite the
overlap.
57. WASH. CONST. art. IV., § 1: "Thejudicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court,
superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the legislature may provide."
58. In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472,476, 172 P. 1152, 1153 (1918). Other inherent powers listed by the
Bruen court were: (1) the power to protect itself, (2) the power to administer justice whether any
previous form of remedy had been granted or not, (3) the power to promulgate rules for its practice, and
(4) the power to provide process where none exists. See also In re Lambuth, 18 Wash. 478, 480, 51 P.
1071, 1072 (1898) (per curiam) (power to strike from the rolls is inherent in court itself because it has the
authority to admit attorneys to practice).
59. The legislature may regulate and restrict the courts' inherent powers, but it may not take them
away. Bruen, 102 Wash. at 477, 172 P. at 1153; Lambuth, 18 Wash. at 480, 51 P. at 1072.
One Washington case held that the supreme court had no authority to disbar an attorney. In re Waugh,
32 Wash. 50, 72 P. 710 (1903). The case was expressly overuled byBruen. Bruen, 102 Wash. at 480, 172
P. at 1155. Another case held that while the court has the power to disbar, the legislature may similarly
define criteria for disbarment. State ex rel. Mackintosh v. Rossman, 53 Wash. 1, 101 P. 357 (1909).
60. See, e.g., Hagan & Van Camp, P.S. v. Kassler Escrow, 96 Wn. 2d 443,453,635 P.2d 730,736
(1981) (the power to regulate the practice of law is solely within the province of the judiciary); In re
Washington State BarAss'n, 86 Wn. 2d 624,632,548 P.2d 310, 315 (1976) (source of court's power to
admit, enroll, disbar, and discipline is exclusively in supreme court); State v. Cook, 84 Wn. 2d 342,
345,525 P.2d761,763 (1974);In re Schatz, 8OWn. 2d 604,607,497 P.2d 153,155 (1972); State exrel.
Schwab v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 80 Wn. 2d 266, 269,493 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1972) (the supreme
court does not share the power of discipline, disbarment, suspension, or reinstatement with either the
legislature or the state bar association); In re Simmons, 59 Wn. 2d 689, 705-06, 369 P.2d 947, 956
(1962) (exclusively the function of the supreme court to either rescind the attorney's privilege to
practice law or suspend it when the attorney's oath has been violated). See also Note, Unauthorized
Practiceof Law-Limited Practiceof Law for Real Estate Closing Officers?, 57 WASH. L. REv.781,
785-86 (1982) (courts' inherent power to regulate admission, discipline, and disbarment has developed
into an exclusive power to regulate the practice of law).
The court has been especially rigorous in striking down legislation that grants nonlawyers the right to
perform legal functions. See Hagan & Van Camp, P.S. v. KasslerEscrow, 96 Wn. 2d 443, 635 P.2d 730
(1981); In reWashington State BarAss'n, 86 Wn. 2d 624,548 P.2d 310 (1976). It is now undisputed that
the supreme court has sole jurisdiction over admission to practice and apparently may deal with the
unauthorized practice of law as an incident of its power over admissions. Offenbacker, Unauthorized
Practiceof Law In Washington, 30 WASH. L. Rv. 249 (1955).
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At first blush the court's expansive language regarding its jurisdiction
suggests that only the judiciary may discipline lawyers. Supreme court
decisions, however, reveal that the court's jurisdiction is limited to discipline of acts within the practice of law. The court's power does not infringe
upon the state's right to regulate lawyers generally. The practical effect of
this arrangement is to subject attorneys to two very different types of
regulation: (I) the court's regulation of professionals requiring compliance
in order to practice law, and (2) state laws regulating conduct.
An example illustrates this dual regulation. A lawyer who commits a
felony in the practice of law may face criminal prosecution by the state, a
61
malpractice suit by the injured party, and a disciplinary action by the bar.
Statutory and common law govern the first two instances. The lawyer may
be fined, put in jail, or forced to pay a damage award. These consequences,
however, do not directly negate the lawyer's right to practice law. The third
instance, by contrast, involves regulation of lawyers within the profession;
the supreme court is the only entity that may suspend or deny the attorney's
privilege to practice law.
Cases cited by the dissent support this proposition as well. 62 The CPA

acts as a general regulatory statute, and as such, does not threaten the
court's regulation of the admission, discipline, and disbarment of lawyers.
Since the court's jurisdiction is limited to regulation of the privilege of
practicing law, it has no exclusive jurisdiction over laws that do not purport
to affect this privilege.
One situation involving the CPA, however, could impinge upon the
supreme court's exclusive regulatory domain. If the CPA were to require
conduct contrary to that specified in the Code of Professional Responsibility, the court's ability to regulate the practice of law would be eclipsed. The
61. Disciplinary proceedings have been characterized as neither civil nor criminal. Niklaus v.
Simmons, 196 F. Supp. 691, 716 (D. Neb. 1961). They are unique and may be characterized as sui
generis. ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYERS DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS, Standard 1.2 (1983).

62. Dicta in cases cited by the dissent suggest that the court limited its "exclusive" language to
admission, discipline, and disbarment within the practice of law. See Hagan & Van Camp, P.S. v.
Kassler Escrow, 96 Wn. 2d 443,453,635 P.2d 730, 736 (1981) (statute authorizing escrow agents and
other lay persons to perform certain transactions with regard to real estate is unconstitutional inasmuch
as the supreme court has the exclusive power to regulate the law); State ex rel. Schwab v. Washington
State Bar Ass'n, 80 Wn. 2d 266, 269, 493 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1972) (membership in the state bar
association and authorization to continue in the practice of law coexist under the aegis of one authority:
the supreme court); Clark v. Washington, 366 R2d 678 (9th Cir. 1966) (the power to admit, enroll, and
disbar attorneys is exclusively held by the supreme court); In re Simmons, 59 Wn. 2d 689, 705-06,369
P.2d 947, 956 (1962) (exclusive function of the court either to rescind the privilege of practicing law or
to suspend it); In re Ballou, 48 Wn. 2d 539, 295 P.2d 316 (1956) (suspension from practice of law for
violating Canon of Professional Ethics); In re Bruen, 102 Wn. 472, 481, 172 P. 1152, 1155 (1918) (only
the supreme court may issue final orders concerning disbarment of attorneys; Board of Governors must
submit findings of facts to court for judgment).
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CPA precludes this possibility, however, by establishing that actions specifically permitted by a Title 18 regulatory board shall not constitute a CPA
violation. 63 Hence, attorneys cannot be liable under the CPA for conduct
specifically permitted by the supreme court. However, acts that are not
specifically permitted or are discouraged by the supreme court could lead
to a CPA violation.
B.

Lawyers and the Consumer ProtectionAct

The court's ruling that the CPA applied to the "entrepreneurial aspects"
of the legal profession properly expanded the CPA's jurisdiction to lawyers.
However, the court erroneously exempted acts occurring in the actual
practice of law. Both state and federal precedent suggest that all aspects of
the legal profession fall within the trade or commerce definition and are
therefore subject to the CPA. Thus the court should have recognized the
CPA's general applicability to the practice of law. The court, however,
should also have declared that certain acts such as professional negligence
are not unfair or deceptive. This solution would have avoided a specific
exemption for the legal profession while also clarifying a muddled area of
consumer protection law.
There are valid reasons for applying the CPA to all aspects of the legal
profession. First, by exempting certain acts from the CPA, the court created
a dual standard for the statute's application that favors the legal profession. 64 Other businesses are not similarly favored even though the CPA's
application may be equally disruptive to the business function. 65
Second, clients often forego remedies in lawyer-client disputes due to
66
the difficulty and expense of establishing malpractice or fraud claims.
The CPA's attorney fees and treble damages provisions would serve as an
incentive for other lawyers to litigate these disputes, thereby increasing the
availability of remedies to the public. The court recognized the importance
of this as to the entrepreneurial aspects of law, but failed to address the need
in the area of the performance of a legal service.
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.170 (1983). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
64. At present, the court's special exemption from the CPA only applies to lawyers. Undoubtedly
other businesses and professions will seek a similar exemption, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of
the statute.
65. Other groups commonly affected by the CPA are construction companies, title and insurance
companies, and real estate agents. See, e.g., Eastlake Constr. v. Hess, 102 Wn. 2d 30, 686 P.2d 465
(1984); Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins., 100 Wn. 2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983); Salois v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins., 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978); Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wn. App. 98, 639 P.2d 832
(1982).
66. See Comment, The Washington Consumer ProtectionAct, supranote 3, at 436. The Washington Supreme Court agreed and cited the Comment. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 62, 691 P.2d
163, 168 (1984).
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Finally, the legislature intended that the CPA be liberally construed so
that "its beneficial purposes may be served." ' 67 It did not exclude the
practice of law from the CPA's scope, but provided for the application of the
CPA to Title 18 regulated businesses and professions when their actions are
not specifically permitted by a governing board. 68 The statute defines trade
and commerce as including the sale of assets or services 69 and subsequent
cases have extended the application of the statute to include unfair or
deceptive acts occurring after the sale. 70 In compliance with the legislative
directive and case law, the CPA ought to be applied to all aspects of the legal

profession.
C.

The Noncommercial Exemption

The Demopolis court clearly decided that the CPA applies to the entrepreneurial aspects of law and that malpractice in the performance of a legal
service is exempt from the CPA's application. 7 1 However, the opinion of

the court and the concurring opinions differed as to what is exempt from the
CPA. The opinion of the court suggests that the actual practice of law is
exempt.7 2 The court concluded, however, that Demopolis does not decide
"whether the CPA applies to every aspect of the practice of law in this state
as to the performance of legal services. " 73This statement suggests that
some acts committed during the performance of a legal service may be
trade or commerce and subject to the CPA. A concurring opinion signed by
four justices tried to clarify the opinion of the court and advocated a strict
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1983).
68. Id. at § 19.86.170. For an explanation of the exemption provision of the CPA, see Comment,
supra note 15. For an explanation of the section's applicability to professionals, see Comment. The
Washington Consumer ProtectionAct, supra note 3, at 446.
A Texas court has held that attorney's acts of negligence are subject to the state deceptive practices
act. The statute had exempted negligence by physicians but not lawyers. See DeBakey v. Staggs, 605
S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd, 612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1981).
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.010 (1983).
70. Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 90 Wn.2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978). In Salois, the court
determined that because the statutory definition of trade or commerce "includes" the sale of assets or
services, the legislature must also have meant acts occurring after the transaction was complete. This
reversed an earlier decision that held that only acts designed to include a sale are subject to the CPA. Id.
at 359-60, 581 P.2d at 1352. For the earlier interpretation see Johnston v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of
Am., 85 Wn. 2d 637, 538 P.2d 510 (1975).
71. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 65-66, 691 P.2d 163, 170-71 (1984).
72. Those claims attacking the performance of plaintiff's legal advice and services are exempt
from the CPA. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d at 61, 691 P.2d at 168. The majority does not clearly articulate
whether these claims are exempt because they are not within the definition of trade or commerce or
because of some other grounds.
73. Id. at 66, 691 P.2d at 170-71. The opinion of the court noted that its ruling would not address
malpractice or misconduct as advocated in a student comment. Id. at 61-62. 691 P.2d at 168. See
Comment, The Washington Consumer ProtectionAct. supra note 3, at 436.
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commercial/noncommercial dividing line for the CPA's application to
lawyers. 74 Under its analysis, the actual practice of law does not constitute
75
trade or commerce and therefore cannot give rise to a CPA violation.
There are problems with this strict distinction. The difference between a
commercial practice involving the obtaining, retaining, or discharge of a
client, and a noncommercial practice involving the professional judgment
of a lawyer is often difficult to discern. For example, it is fairly clear that a
lawyer who deceptively advertises should fall within the scope of the
CPA. 76 But it is less clear whether a lawyer who violates a fiduciary
obligation, such as the duty of undivided loyalty, has committed a CPA
violation. 77 A strict commercial/noncommercial dividing line suggests that
this breach of duty would be malpractice in the actual practice of law and
exempt from the CPA. 78 Arguably, however, the attorney's assertion of
loyalty could have been fised either to obtain or retain the client and
79
therefore is an entrepreneurial aspect as defined by the court.
It is also unclear whether actual fraud in the performance of a legal
service would lead to a CPA violation. Fraud is not malpractice, and thus it
would not be exempted on that basis. 80 But if the commercial/noncommercial dividing line is meaningful, fraud in the actual practice of law would be
exempt.
The commercial/noncommercial distinction is based on federal case law.
Justice Pearson, in the four-justice concurring opinion, noted that the
opinions of Goldfarb and other federal cases refusing to apply a professional exemption considered only the business aspects of the allegedly
74. For the four-justice concurring opinion response to this apparent inconsistency, see supra note
49.
75. In order for the CPA to apply, the act or practice must occur in trade or commerce. WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.86.020 (1983). See supra note 12.
76. In another concurring opinion, Justice Dore urged that the CPA be applied to one non-business
aspect, that of deceptive advertising. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d52, 67,691 P.2d 163,173 (1984)
(Dore, J., concurring). However, the definition of "entrepreneurial" given in the opinion of the court
would include advertising. Advertising appears to be a way in which a law firm "obtains" its clients. Id.
at 61, 691 P.2d at 168. Justice Dore also suggested that if the deceptively advertising lawyer later
mishandles the case through negligence, the negligence ought to be subject to the CPA. Id. at 68, 691
P.2d at 173 (Dore, J., concurring). A former president of the Washington BarAssociation has stated that
the Demopolis rationale would probably apply to legal advertising. Campbell, The CPA Decision:A
Reminder to Stress Competence, 39 WASH. STATE BAR NEWS 11 (1985).
77. Fiduciary obligations encompass a duty to represent the client with undivided loyalty, to
preserve the client's confidence, and to disclose any material matters bearing upon the representation of
the obligations. The breach of a fiduciary obligation is a form of malpractice. R. MAL.LEN & V. LEvrr,
supra note 5, at 126. A breach of a fiduciary obligation constitutes constructive fraud. Id. at 111.
78. Both the opinion of the court and the four-justice concurring opinion would exempt malpractice in the actual practice of law from the CPA. Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 66, 70, 691 P.2d
163, 170, 171 (1984).
79. Id. at 61, 691 P.2d at 168. See supra note 6 for a definition of "entrepreneurial aspects."
80. See supra note 5.
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anticompetitive professions. 8 1 Although federal courts have considered the
business aspects of the professions, they have not advocated an exemption
of certain aspects on the basis of a trade or commerce distinction.
The United States Supreme Court in Goldfarb ruled that all aspects of
law fall within the trade or commerce category, but that some aspects of the
profession may be exempt on other grounds. 82 The Goldfarb Court stated
that the legal service in question, the examination of a land title, was
commerce when exchanged for money.83 Implicitly, this dictum suggests
that the exchange of money for any legal service may lead to the application
of antitrust laws. Goldfarb's caveat conceded that professionals may require different considerations than other businesses. However, this caveat
referred to the states' right to proscribe certain behavior counter to antitrust
law, and not to whether the practice of law was trade or commerce. 84 All
federal cases, with only one exception, have followed the Goldfarb line of
reasoning.85

81. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d at 69, 691 P.2d at 171 (Pearson, J., concurring).
82. 16E J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 13, at 49-10. The Court concluded that the practice of law
was commerce by virtue of lawyers selling services. The Court acknowledged, however, that the
differences between professions and businesses may be relevant in determining whether a restraint
imposed by a professional organization violated the Sherman Act. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 787-88 (1975). See Kissam, Webber, Bigus, and Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital
Privileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 595, 612-18 (1982); Veizaga v.
National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,274 (N.D. Itl. Jan. 27, 1977).
83. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787.
84. The issue in Goldfarb and subsequent cases was whether antitrust principles or the regulatory
agency's anticompetitive rule ought to prevail. In Goldfarb, the bar association urged that minimum fee
schedules were valid despite their anticompetitive effects. The Court disagreed. But in a cautionary
footnote it proposed that the special characteristics of professions may require a rule of reason analysis
that would in some cases uphold a profession's rule despite its anticompetitive effects. Id. at 788 n. 17.
Demopolis, by contrast, did not present the court with a conflict between an ethical rule and antitrust
legislation. If Demopolis' allegations were proved correct, his former attorneys violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Since the CPA and the Code are in agreement that the alleged activities are
harmful to the public, the court did not need to determine whether one provision ought to prevail over
the other. In cases such as this, where the attorneys' ethical code and the CPA are consistent in their
treatment of unfair and deceptive acts, it is unnecessary to restrict the CPA to only entrepreneurial
activities. For federal cases that have considered the application of antitrust to professional rules, see,
e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (foundation for medical care
established maximum fee schedules for member doctors); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (engineers' canon of ethics prohibiting competitive bidding in
engineering contracts); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (Code of Professional Responsibility
disciplinary rule prohibiting advertising).
85. See Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 82, at 616. The one exception is Selman
v. Harvard Medical School, 494 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd mem., 636 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir.
1980). Selman followed MarjorieWebster and developed a commercial/noncommercial argument. See
infra note 90 and accompanying text. This line of reasoning is dubious in light of Supreme Court
decisions in Goldfarband ProfessionalEng'rs.Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 82, at
616.
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The commercial/noncommercial distinction of the concurring opinion
was taken primarily from MarjorieWebster JuniorCollege, Inc. v. Middle
States Association of College and Secondary Schools, a pre-Goldfarb
case. 86 The concurring opinion's reliance on this case is misplaced for two
reasons. First, since Marjorie Webster was decided prior to Goldfarb, it
does not incorporate the Supreme Court's analysis that all aspects of a
profession are trade or commerce. 87 Second, MarjorieWebster developed a

different commercial/noncommercial distinction than that proposed in
Demopolis. The case held that an educational association's refusal to
accredit a for-profit college was a noncommercial venture and therefore not
a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 88 According to the court, the

Sherman Act was not tailored for the "noncommercial aspects of the liberal
arts and the learned professions." 89 The court noted, however, that if an
educational association's acts were commercially motivated, antitrust law
could apply. 90 Therefore, the motivation for the activity actually determined whether the Sherman Act would be applicable.
A distinction limited solely to entrepreneurial aspects does not encompass a motivation test. While not the best solution, the Marjorie Webster
court's analysis at least left future courts with the ability to conclude that
some acts of accreditation are noncommercial, while similar acts which are
86. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). The four-justice concurrence
primarily relied upon Marjorie Webster, but also cited Frahm v. Urkovich, 113 IlL. App. 3d 580, 447
N.E.2d 1007 (1983), for the commercial/noncommercial principle. Shortv. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d52,
69, 691 P.2d 163, 171 (1984) (Pearson, L, concurring). Frahm is not discussed because it outlines no
broad principles applicable to this case other than its reliance upon Goldfarb'sfootnote 17. In addition,
the Frahm court was impressed that the actual practice of law could have no direct effect on the
consuming public. Frahm, 447 N.E.2d at 1010. This argument is inapplicable toDemopolis, since the
public interest test was not considered by the supreme court. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d at 71-72, 691 P.2d
at 172 (Pearson, L, concurring).
87. Veizagav. National Bd. forRespiratoryTherapy, 1977-1 TRADECAS. (CCH) 61,274 (N.D. IlL.
Jan. 27, 1977) (the analysis ofMarjorieWebster was conducted for the purpose of determining whether
the activity was totally exempt from the antitrust laws. Goldfarbmakes it clear that there is no such total
exemption).
88. MarjorieWebster, 432 F.2d at 654. A possible explanation for the court's willingness to create
a commerciallnoncommercial distinction was its reluctance to interfere in the affairs of an educational
institution. Id. at 654. Marjorie Webster has been cited as authority supporting an educational
exemption from antitrust law. See Weistart, Antitrust Issues in the Regulation of College Sports, 5 J.
COLL. & UNIv. L. 77, 79-81 (1979).
89. Marjorie Webster, 432 F.2d at 654.
90. Id. at 655 n.21. "For example, if accreditation were denied any institution purchasing
textbooks from a supplier who did not provide special discounts for association members, it would be
hard to imagine other than a commercial motive for the action." Thus the Marjorie Webster court
concluded that accreditation could be subject to antitrust law if the motive of the act was commercial.
The apparent definition of "commercial" in Marjorie Webster is that which is done for economic
protection or personal gain, while "noncommercial" motives pertain to those acts that benefit society as
part of the profession's public service. Annot., 39 A.L.R. FED. 774, 780 (1978).
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commercially motivated may subject the actor to antitrust law. 9 1 A strict
commercial/noncommercial formula is incapable of making such a fine
92
distinction.
D.

Washington's Definition of Trade or Commerce

93
Following the legislative directive to be guided by federal decisions,
the Demopolis court looked to federal precedent to ascertain the meaning
of trade or commerce. 94 But Washington courts should look to federal case
law for assistance only when sections of the CPA are not defined by the
Washington legislature. 95 Where the legislature has defined a term within

the statute, it is unnecessary for the court to apply federal definitions.
Unlike its federal counterpart, the CPA specifically defines trade and
91. In an amicus curiae brief to Goldfarb, the American Bar Association argued against a
distinction based upon commercial/noncommercial aspects of the legal profession. Rather, the Bar
Association proposed that the Marjorie Webster solution concerning commercial purposes might prove
a workable test. Brief for American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 11.Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
However, others have disagreed with the Marjorie Webster test, arguing that the essential factor in
Sherman Act proceedings is the commercial effect of the action and not the purpose for the action. See
e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 486,489 (1950). This test would also
negate the commercial aspects reasoning of the Demopolis court. See Comment. The Applicability of
the Sherman Act, supra note 3, at 324-27; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae: Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
92. A federal case demonstrates the weakness of the commercial/noncommercial analysis. In In re
Wilson Chem. Co.. 64 F.T.C. 168 (1964), the FTC issued a cease and desist order against a collection
lawyer for deceptively inducing his client's customers to pay overdue bills. Id. at 186-90. Since the
lawyer's practice was collections, by definition his acts occurred within "the actual practice of law."
According to the Demopolis entrepreneurial aspect formula, however, this attorney's acts are not
entrepreneurial and therefore not subject to the CPA. See supra note 6 for the Demopolis definition of
entrepreneurial.
One commentator has argued that in the case of attorney debt collections, the activity ought to be
considered commercial since it is regularly engaged in by non-attorneys in a totally commercial setting.
See Lewis, Regulation of Attorney Debt Collectors-The Role of the FTC and The Bar, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 669, 686 (1984).
Although not noted by the court, the FTC has stated its intention to pursue only the "business
practices" as distinguished from the "quality of care" aspects of the profession. S. REP. No. 451. 97th
Cong.. 2d Sess. 12 (1982). While this statement clarifies the FTC's prosecutorial and enforcement
intentions, it does not answer the question of whether the practice of law is trade or commerce. It more
accurately reflects the Commission's concern with not treading upon an area traditionally regulated by
the states. See H.R. REP. No. 156, 98th Cong., lst Sess. 13 (1983) (purports to limit the FTC's ability to
invalidate any state law that establishes "training, education, or experience requirements for the
licensure of professionals" or "permissible tasks or duties which may be performed by professionals
and which are based in fact on specialized training or education").
93. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.920 (1983).
94. Demtopolis. 103 Wn. 2d at 56, 691 P.2d at 165-66.
95. The court should look to federal precedent to define terms not defined by the CPA. such as
"unfair or deceptive" acts. See supra note 16.
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commerce as including the sale of assets or services. 96 The Washington
Supreme Court has also expanded this definition to include unfair or
deceptive acts occurring during the performance of a contract, but unrelated to deception in the formation of a contract. 97 Moreover, the court has
held that another profession, the practice of medicine, is within the antitrust
98
definition of trade.
Further evidence for including the professions within the trade or commerce definition is the legislature's failure to specifically exempt professions from the statute. 99 The exemption provision within the CPA only
exempts professional activities if they are specifically permitted by the
regulatory board. 100
Since the legislature provided its own definition of trade and commerce,
it was unnecessary for the court to look to federal interpretations. 10 1
Post-Goldfarbfederal decisions appear to include all aspects of the professions within the commerce definition; Washington law and precedent
clearly point in this direction. The Demopolis court's attempt to restrict the
definition of trade or commerce probably reflects its recognition that there
are problems with the CPA's application to the legal profession. These
problems are capable of being addressed by the statute, however, which
makes a special exemption for the legal profession unnecessary.
E.

Strict Liability and the Legal Profession

The four-justice concurring opinion's primary concern with applying the
CPA to the practice of law was that Washington courts do not require proof
of intent to deceive when attempting to establish deceptive acts. 102 In order
to prove a CPA violation it is sufficient that an act or practice has the
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.010 (1983). The FICA does not promulgate its own definition of
trade or commerce but instead relies on a general definition of commerce. As defined in the FTCA,
commerce applies to commerce among the several states and foreign nations. 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1982).
The FTCA has also been amended to encompass unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting commerce. 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1982). The Washington CPA only encompasses unfair or deceptive acts in trade or
commerce. See supra note 12.
97. See Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1975).
98. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
99. Cf. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.170 (1983), which specifically exempts transactions regulated
by the insurance commissioner, the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, or the
Federal Power Commission. See also DeBakey v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980)
(court noted that the negligence of physicians was specifically exempted from the CPA, while that of
lawyers was not), aff'd, 612 S.W.2d 924 (Fex. 1981).
100. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.170 (1983). See supra note 15.
101. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d 52, 691 P.2d 163 (1984).
102. Demopolis, 103 Wn. 2d at 70, 691 P.2d at 172.
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capacity to deceive. 103 Therefore good faith is irrelevant to a CPA violation.104 Since the CPA focuses on deception of the client rather than the
attorney's breach of due care, once deception has been established, liability
results. To apply strict liability to the profession of law would radically alter
the present standard of care and make it difficult for a lawyer to effectively
05
perform the role of legal counselor. 1
While this concern is valid, it does not warrant a special exemption for
attorneys. The court could have instead relied on safeguards within the
statute to protect the normal operations of the legal profession. Section
19.86.920 of the Washington Code requires that the CPA not be construed
"to prohibit acts or practices which are reasonable in relation to the
development and preservation of business." 106 The attorney's role as advocate and advisor is essential to the legal profession. Since strict liability
would unduly disrupt this aspect of the profession, it should not be applied
to this practice of law. If the court had applied the reasonable practices
provision rather than a blanket exemption for the performance of law, it
could have avoided the CPA's strict liability aspect and still retained the
possibility of applying the statute to egregious acts committed by attorneys
in the actual practice of law. Essentially, the court would then have
transformed a no-fault CPA action into one requiring the existence of fault
on the part of the lawyer.
F. Unfair or Deceptive Acts
The four-justice concurring opinion also illustrates a confusing aspect of
the CPA. The capacity-to-deceive test was designed to deter deceptive
103.
104.

Fisher v. World-Wide Trophy Outfitters. 15 Wn. App. 742. 748, 551 P.2d 1398. 1403 (1976).
Id.

105. The elements of legal malpractice in the state of Washington are: existence of attorney-client
relationship, existence of a duty on the part of a lawyer, failure to perform the duty, and negligence that
must have been the proximate cause of damage to the client. Sherry v. Diercks. 29 Wn. App. 433. 437.
628 P.2d 1336. 1338 (1981).
The standard of care expected of an attorney is that degree of care, skill, diligence, and knowledge
commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful, and prudent lawyer in the practice of law.

Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wn. 2d 854, 601 P.2d 1279 (1979). An attorney who professes to be a specialist in a
field of law will be held to the standard of performance of those who similarly hold themselves out as
specialists in that area. Id. at 860, 601 P.2d at 1283. The standards for the practice of law are the same
throughout the state and do not differ in various communities. Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing. 73
Wn. 2d 393, 395.438 P.2d 865, 866 (1968). See Lewis, supra note 92, at 704-05 (urges incorporation
of the -'false, deceptive, or misleading" standard of the FTCA into the Code of Professional Responsibility as applied to attorney debt collectors). See generally Comment, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices.
supra note 3.
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1983). This provision has caused the court to narrowly
interpret the term "unfair methods of competition" asembodied in § 19.86.020. See State v. Black. 100
Wn. 2d 793. 803, 676 P.2d 963, 969 (1984).
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conduct before injury occurs. 107 Thus, under federal law it is typically
applied to the inducement stage of a business relationship. 108 The test for
unfair acts, which generally applies to the performance part of a transaction, is different. Under federal law, an unfair act occurs when it: (1)causes
substantial injury to consumers, (2) violates established public policy, and
(3) is unethical or unscrupulous. 109 While neither test encompasses a bad
faith requirement, the FTC does consider the defendant's bad faith when
awarding damages. 110 Since the CPA does allow for damages this consideration could be applied to Washington cases.
It is not clear whether Washington courts distinguish between acts in the
inducement and the performance stage of a transaction.111 In addition,
Washington courts have not explicitly decided whether an unfair act under
the Washington CPA requires a finding of bad faith. 112
Before ruling that a lawyer has violated the CPA during the performance
stage of a transaction with a client, Washington courts should require a
finding that the lawyer has acted in bad faith. Without such a requirement,
the typical malpractice or breach of contract claim would be engulfed by
the CPA. A bad faith test comports with the lawyers' Code of Professional
107. See 16J J. VON KALNowsKI, supra note 13, at 122-3.
108. Treatises discussing "deceptive" acts generally refer to advertising and other representations
used to induce a sale. See, e.g., id. at 122-1 to 122-29.
109. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5 (1972). In 1980, the FTC
elaborated on the Sperry declaration and stated that, to justify a finding of unfairness, the injury must
satisfy three tests: (1) the injury must be substantial; (2) the injury must not be outweighed by any
offsetting consumer or competitive benefits that the sales practice also produces; and (3) the injury must
be one which consumers could not reasonably have avoided. H.R.REP. No. 156, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
35-40 (1983). The FTC has since merged the third requirement of Sperry into the other two. Id. at 40.
110. ABA ANTIusT SECTION, ANTITRusT LAW DEvELoPMENTs 307 (2d ed. 1984). A suggested
definition of bad faith is conduct that constitutes an "evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of
diligence and slacking off, [and] willfull rendering of imperfect performance." WASHINGToN DESKBOOK, supra note 14, at 27-28, quoting REsTATRMENT (SEcoND) oF COrzTAcrs § 205 comment d
(1971). Negligence should not fall within this definition unless the acts or omissions could be termed
"reckless" negligence.
111. Some courts have required proof of bad faith before a breach of contract will be found unfair or
deceptive. See Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wn. App. 98,112,639 P.2d 832,840 (1982) (CPA should not apply
to an isolated, after-the-fact breach of private contract where the breach of contract was not done in bad
faith or does not constitute a violation of the law). Since Nuttall involved a possible violation of the
Broker's Act, it is not clear whether the court cited the bad faith element of Salois due to the per se
nature of the claim, or as an independent requirement of all after-the-fact breaches. See also Pilch v.
Hendrix, 22Wn. App. 531,533,591 P.2d 824,826 (1979) (defendant's breach of contract does not give
rise to a CPA claim in the absence of bad faith and the public interest requirement as defined in Salois).
Most decisions incorporating a "bad faith" requirement, however, have involved a per se situation
where the alleged violation was of a statutorily designated duty of good faith. See, e.g., Salois v. Mutual
of Omaha Ins., 90 Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978).
For an analysis suggesting that the Washington courts are restricting the CPA to violations occurring
only in the inducement stage, see Comment, The ConsumerProtectionAct PrivateRight ofAction: A
Reevaluation, 19 GONz. L. REv. 673 (1985).
112. WASHINGTON DESKBOOK, supra note 14, at 27-27.
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Responsibility which generally requires a knowing violation of the Disciplinary Rules. 13 Moreover, such a requirement is consistent with the
policy of not interfering with the reasonable practice of law, and it places
limits on the instances in which treble damages can be awarded. " 4 Finally,
the court could clarify a murky area of CPA interpretation by enunciating a
single standard that would be applicable to professionals and other businesses alike.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Demopolis decision is a major step forward for the consuming
public, but it falls short of delivering the full benefits of the CPA. The court
appears to exclude the actual performance of a legal service from the
definition of trade or commerce. This is contrary to federal precedent and
the plain meaning of the Washington CPA. The court's ruling shelters
certain conduct from the statute's purview, despite the motivation for and
harmful effect of the conduct.
The court should have recognized that, like other services, the legal
profession is within the definition of trade or commerce as set forth by the
Washington CPA. The court could then have excluded those elements
incompatible with the practice of law on the basis of the reasonable
practices provision. The court could also have explicitly defined unfair and
deceptive practices in the performance phase of a service as requiring bad
faith before a CPA violation would be found. This interpretation would have
clarified an unclear area of the law and developed a general rule capable of
application to all businesses and professions.
Jeffrey M. Koontz

113.

See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1981) (shall not

knowingly reveal confidences or secrets); DR 7-101(A) (shall not intentionally fail to represent clients
through available means). The recently adopted Washington Rules of Professional Conduct also refer to
"knowing" violations. See, e.g.. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8.4(a) (1985) (knowingly assist or

induce another to violate the Rules).
The existence of good faith is not a relevant factor in a negligence or malpractice action. However,
bad faith may be indicative of fraud. R. MALLEN & V. LEvIT, supra note 5, at 342.
114. WASHINGTON DESKBOOK, supra note 14, at 27-28.

